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This thesis focuses on the Taliban and the PKK’s involvement in the opium trade. This 
thesis fills a gap by illustrating the extent to which terrorist organizations use drugs to 
raise funds in five stages of the heroin trade, including cultivation, manufacturing, 
shipment, sale, and consumption. These two terrorist organizations have particular 
strengths and weaknesses that are identified in this thesis. This thesis proposes the 
counter narcoterrorism solution model, which displays both the convergent and divergent 
stages of the opium trade. The manufacturing stage is the only stage where the products 
converge into countable and targetable laboratories. This model suggests that targeting 
the opium manufacturing process is not only cost effective, but can also reduce the 
Taliban’s as well as the PKK’s illegal funds.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.  BACKGROUND 
After the Cold War, states generally stopped financing terrorist organizations. 
That led these organizations to develop sources of financing on their own. Terrorist 
organizations now acquire the majority of their income from criminal activities, and one 
of the most lucrative terrorist criminal activities is drug trafficking.1 The nexus between 
terrorist organizations and the illegal drug trade has increased since the end of Cold War.2 
According to a recent study, “The illegal drug trade is estimated to turn over more than 
$330 billion annually,”3 and terrorist organizations have participated in this trade.4 In 
order to combat terrorist activities effectively, counter-terrorism forces and agencies 
should address the process of fundraising, of which drug trafficking is a main source.  
Within the scholarly research on terrorism and drug trafficking, the extent of 
cooperation between terrorist organizations and drug dealers, and the amount of money 
generated by terrorist organizations through the drug trafficking process is largely 
unknown. The Congressional Research Service Report on International Terrorism and 
Transnational Crime, dated March 18, 2010 argues that “analysts observe that there 
remains an intelligence and research gap in the prevalence, threat, and future trends 
associated with criminal-terrorist links.”5 Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether 
the risk of narcoterrorism is decreasing, increasing or remaining at the same level. The 
same report suggests that credible intelligence sources are needed to counter the 
narcoterrorism threat. Knowledge of the subject provided by academic research is 
required by both the intelligence community and policymakers who then can formulate 
                                                 
1 Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security," Survival 36, no. 1 
(Spring 1994), 321.  
2 James Piazza, "The Illicit Drug Trade, Counternarcotics Strategies and Terrorism," Public Choice 
149, no. 3 12, 2011,  298.  
3 Steve Rolles et al., The Alternative World Drug Report Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs 
Count the Costs, 2012. 
4 Narco–Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism—A Dangerous Mix (Washington: 
US Government Printing Office, 2003, 1. 
5 John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler, International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security 
Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2010, 4. 
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appropriate strategies to combat narcoterrorism once the questions of  how, why, and 
under what circumstances the terrorists and drug dealers coordinate with each other are 
answered.6  
There also exist many difficulties in defining a clear strategy to reduce the 
funding generated by terrorist organizations through drug trafficking, without 
understanding more precisely the amount generated through the drug trafficking process 
than it is generated.7 This thesis will try to fill these gaps of the terrorist narcotic 
interactions by providing a model which could offer a reasonable solution for cutting the 
links between drugs and terrorists. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
The main research question of this thesis is, “How can states reduce a terrorist 
organization’s funds raised through drug trafficking?” To answer this question, we will 
first analyze the extent to which terrorist organizations use drug trafficking to raise funds 
and then identify the weak and vulnerable links in terrorist drug trafficking systems. 
This thesis first divides the illicit drug trafficking process into five stages: 
cultivation, manufacturing, shipment, sale, consumption. Second, the study calculates   
the extent of two terrorist organizations’ (the Taliban and the PKK) involvement in these 
five stages. This research also intends to create a counter narcoterrorist model displaying 
weak and vulnerable links which will propose counter measures against each step of the 
process and present measures to reduce the terrorist funding gained through illicit means.  
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a debate whether states should target the supply or demand side of the 
drug trade. Similarly, the 2006 CRS Report for Congress claims that “proponents of 
vastly expanded supply reduction options, and specifically of herbicidal crop eradication, 
argue that this method is the most cost-effective and efficient means of eliminating illicit 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 “The illegal drug trade is estimated to turn over more than $330 billion annually” (Steve Rolles et al., 
The Alternative World Drug Report Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs Count the Costs, 2012). 
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drug producing crops.”8 On the supply side, “A reduction in the supply of illicit drugs can 
be made in several ways:  by restricting the importation, manufacture and production of 
illicit drugs; by limiting the availability of the source material or the precursors, the 
substances used to manufacture them; [and] by reducing the availability of drugs at the 
street level.”9 To the contrary, though, Wyler argues that counternarcotics campaigns 
designed for crop eradication can cause the unintentional result of adding to and further 
accelerating the state’s ongoing civil turmoil.10 Felbab-Brown suggests that the most 
efficient way to fight narcoterrorism is through a reduction in drug demand, which 
requires an aggressive global anti-drug campaign.11 However, the International Narcotics 
Control Board suggests:  
Demand reduction efforts cannot lead to success without substantially 
reducing the illicit drug supply:  if drugs are readily available and easily 
accessible, new drug abusers will soon replace former ones. At the same 
time, there is evidence that elimination of a given drug from the market 
does not mean the elimination of the drug problem but only a shift towards 
other drugs or substances of abuse. Consequently,  without efforts to 
reduce illicit drug demand,  actions aimed at reducing illicit drug supply 
will lead to only temporary successes.12  
 
 
                                                 
8 Raphael F. Perl, International Drug Trade and U.S. Foreign Policy CRS Report for Congress, 
November 6, 2006. 
9 Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to the Fight Against the Illicit Production, Sale, 
Demand, Traffic and Distribution of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Related Activities, 
1998International Narcotics Control Board,[1998]). 6. 
10 Liana Sun Wyler, International Drug Control Policy Congressional Research Service, August 24, 
2009. 
11 Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Globalization and Narcoterrorism," in State of Corruption, State of Chaos: 
The Terror of Political Malfeasance , ed. Michaelene Cox (USA: Lexington Books, 2008), 28. 
12 Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to the Fight Against the Illicit Production, Sale, 
Demand, Traffic and Distribution of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Related Activities, 
1998International Narcotics Control Board, 1998. 
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There is more scholarly consensus on the increased cooperation between terrorist 
organizations and drug dealers, especially the active role played by the Taliban and the 
PKK in the opium trade. The UNODC World Drug Report of 2012 explains that there 
exists no doubt in the links between drug trafficking and terrorist organizations 
worldwide.13 The CRS report summary on International Terrorism and Transnational 
Crime, dated March 18, 2010, also claims that the cooperation between criminals and 
terrorist organizations is growing.14 Gretchen Peters points out that out of the State 
Department’s forty-two designated terrorist groups, eighteen have connections with drug 
trafficking and thirteen of the smuggling organizations for the U.S. illicit drug supply 
have connections with terrorist organizations.15  
According to the statement given by Placido before the subcommittee on National 
Security and Foreign Affairs entitled “Transnational Drug Enterprises (part ii): Threats to 
Global Stability and U.S. Policy Responses,” “There is a clear and direct link between the 
illicit drug trade and insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The Taliban and other anti-
government elements exploit the illicit drug trade to facilitate their financial, logistical, 
and political objectives and thereby jeopardize the prospect of long-term security and 
stability, reconstruction, and effective governance.”16 Peters in an interview with 
Ahmadullah Alizai in Kandahar finds that “the smugglers forged a direct link to the 
Taliban and al Qaeda. They get the terrorists to move their drugs.”17  
 
 
                                                 
13 UNODC World Drug Report 2012 United Nations, June 2012, 85. 
14 Rollins and Wyler, International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. 
Policy, and Considerations for Congress  
15 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror : How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 1st ed. 
(New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009), 10. 
16 P. Anthony Placido, Transnational Drug Enterprises (Part Ii): Threats to Global Stability and U.S. 
Policy Responses DEA Public Affairs, March 3, 2010. 
17 Peters, Seeds of Terror : How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 3. 
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Likewise, the PKK has been actively involved in trafficking drugs to Europe, and 
it has been estimated that they control 70–80 percent of European heroin trade.18 
According to the 1999 annual report of The International Narcotics Control Strategy, 
prepared by the U.S. State Department, “the PKK not only is directly involved in 
transporting and marketing narcotics in Europe but also extracts so-called revolutionary 
taxes from narcotics traffickers and refiners in order to finance terrorist actions.”19 
 
   
                                                 
18 Michael Freeman, Financing Terrorism : Case Studies (Farnham; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 
70. 
19 Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: 
Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 10 
(10, 2007), 907, 908. 
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II. DRUG TRAFFICKING, TERRORIST FINANCING,  
AND THEIR NEXUS  
The Alternative World Drug report suggests that the illegal drug trade revenue is 
approximately 330 billion dollars annually.20 Drug traders around the world require 
assistance from groups having military skills, weapons, access to clandestine 
organizations, and safe havens. While “opiates and cocaine remain the most problematic 
drugs across the globe,”21 this thesis looks at only opiates, as it is the most cost effective 
and lethal illicit drug. 
The UNODC 2012 report states that Afghanistan generates 63 percent of the 
world’s poppy crop,22 and out of the 75–80 metric tons of heroin being trafficked to 
Europe in 2009, 60 metric tons of heroin were transferred through the Balkan route23 
involving the PKK as a major source of drug trafficking. Therefore, this thesis targets the 
terrorist organization operating in Afghanistan, the Taliban, and the group getting the 
highest benefit from the heroin trade in Europe, the PKK.  
This chapter is framed under two thematic sections. The first section provides an 
overview of the drug process and divides it into five stages: cultivation, manufacturing, 
shipment, sales, and consumption. The second section covers the nexus between the drug 
trafficking process and the financing of the Taliban and PKK.  
A.  DRUG TRAFFICKING PROCESS 
According to the UNODC 2012 report, there are 230 million consumers who have 
at least used illegal drugs once in their life, and of those 27 million are drug addicts. This 
report claims that 200,000 people are killed each year due to heroin and other drug 
                                                 
20 Rolles et al., The Alternative World Drug Report Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs, 8. 
21 Caterina Gouvis Roman, Heather Ahn-Redding and Rita James Simon, Illicit Drug Policies, 
Trafficking, and use the World Over, 1st pbk ed. (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, a division of Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 15. 
22 UNODC World Drug Report 2012, 27. 
23 World Drug Report 2011 UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), 2011. 
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consumption. In addition to undermining economic and social development, the use of 
these drugs has brought misery to thousands of people and contributed to a rise of crime, 
instability, insecurity and the spread of HIV around the world.24   
Illegal drug trafficking is an enormous global market, which includes the 
cultivation, manufacturing, shipment, distribution, and selling of prohibited drugs. This 
section deals with each node of the illegal drug trafficking process with an aim of 
identifying the vulnerable links in this process. 
1. Cultivation 
Heroin is produced from an opium poppy flowering plant that blossoms in warm 
dry weather. The plant requires a growing period of approximately six to seven months 
and is generally cultivated in ungoverned zones. The main explanation for opium crop 
cultivation is the incomparable profits involved in this business.25 The most suitable 
places for its cultivation are Afghanistan, Myanmar, and the Golden Triangle.26 
According to the UNODC 2012 report, Afghanistan remains the main country for opium 
poppy cultivating, and accounts for two thirds of the global opium poppy cultivation. The 
graph (Figure 1) from the UNODC 2012 report displays that the opium poppy cultivation 
area has increased from 191,000 hectares (ha) in 2010 to 207,000 ha in 2011 and the total 
production observed in 2011 was 7,000 tons (Figure 2). The amount of production was  
20 % less than 2007, but displayed an increase from 2010, the year in which the opium 
harvest was reduced by half due to disease.27 The opium cultivation regions of 
Afghanistan are mainly Badakhshan, Nangarhar and Helmand provinces. 28  
                                                 
24 UNODC World Drug Report 2012. 
25 David Mansfield, The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality, August 
2001. 
26 U. Zerell, B. Ahrens and P. Gerz, "Documentation of a Heroin Manufacturing Process in 
Afghanistan," Bulletin on Narcotics 47, no. 1&2 (2005), 12. 
27 UNODC World Drug Report 2012, 26. 




Figure 1.   Global Illicit Cultivation of Opium  Poppy (From UNODC 2012) 
 
Figure 2.   Global Potential Opium Production (From UNODC 2012) 
According to Goodhand’s analysis of the UNODC report, 3.3 million people in 
Afghanistan receive their income from poppies. These people include 80,000 farmers, 
48,000 itinerant laborers, 20,000 traders and traffickers, plus their families. He also notes 
that the poppy business is far more profitable than the aid economy.29 
2.  Manufacturing  
Manufacturing is the conversion of raw materials into consumable drugs. 
According to the UNODC 2011 report, the country which manufactures the greatest 
amount of heroin from its poppy crop is Afghanistan.30 According to the UNODC 2009 
report, there were 57 heroin processing laboratories in Afghanistan.31  
                                                 
29 Jonathan Goodhand, "Frontiers and Wars: The Opium Economy in Afghanistan," Journal of 
Agrarian Change 5, no. 2 (04, 2005), 207. 
30 World Drug Report 2011, 61. 
31 World Drug Report 2009 UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), 2009. 
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While examining the total opium production of 2011 (Figure 3), it is estimated 
that 3,400 tons out of a total 7,000 tons were utilized or shipped as raw opium, and the 
rest was transformed into heroin. The total heroin produced in 2011 is estimated at 467 
tons, as compared to approximately 384 tons in 2010. It was also estimated that a large 
quantity of Afghan opium was not converted into heroin in 2011, as compared to 
previous years.32 
The cumbersome process of pure heroin manufacturing consists of nine stages: 
extracting the morphine from raw opium, separating the morphine solution from the 
water-insoluble opium components, treatment of the water-insoluble opium constituents, 
precipitation-isolation-drying of the morphine, conversion of the morphine into heroin, 
precipitation and isolation of the brown heroin base, purification of the brown heroin 
base, precipitation and isolation of the white heroin base, and conversion of the heroin 
base to heroin hydrochloride.33 
 
        2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2010  2011
Total potential opium production  4850 4620 6610 8890 8641 7853  4736  6995
Potential opium not processed into 
heroin 
1197 1169 2056 3411 3080 2898  1728  3400
Potential opium processed into heroin 3653 3451 4555 5479 5561 4955  3008  3595
Total potential heroin manufacture 529 472 629 757 752 667  384  467
Figure 3.   Potential Illicit Production of Opium and Manufacture of Heroin of 
Unknown Purity in Tons (From UNODC 2012) 
3. Shipment 
Shipment refers to the movement of heroin from the origin to the place of 
demand. The map (Figure 4) from UNODC 2012 report displays that from the production 
areas, Afghan heroin trafficking routes are mainly distributed in three directions. The first 
                                                 
32 UNODC World Drug Report 2012, 26. 
33 Zerell, Ahrens and Gerz, Documentation of a Heroin Manufacturing Process in Afghanistan, 11-31. 
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route, involving 115 tons, is along the Iranian border, originating from Nimroz, Farah and 
Hirat provinces. The second route, involving 160 tons, is trafficked to Pakistan, and the 
third route, involving 90 tons, runs through the central Asian countries of Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.34  
The map displays that along these three main routes, there are multiple illicit 
organizations involved in the shipment of heroin products. The U.S. counternarcotics 
agents seized a satellite telephone from a drug smuggler’s house in Kabul, which 
revealed that smugglers repeatedly call terrorist organizations in Western Europe, 
Turkey, and the Balkans.”35  
 
Figure 4.  Afghan Heroin Trafficking Routes and Volumes in 2009  
(From UNODC 2011) 
4. Sale  
Sale refers to the middle node between shippers and consumers. This involves the 
wholesale and retail drug selling process. The graph (Figure 5) from the UNODC 2012 
report depicts that Afghanistan opium production has returned to the 2009 level after a 
                                                 
34 World Drug Report 2011, 71. 
35 Peters, Seeds of Terror : How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 3. 
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drop in 2010, which was caused by disease.36 Similarly, the U.S. and the European 
market have also displayed minor change since 2009. However, the farm-gate prices have 
shown a continuous rise since 2009 in Afghanistan. The rise in price indicates that illegal 
demand for heroin is increasing despite control over opium production. 37 
 
Figure 5.   Opium Prices and Production in Afghanistan Compared with Retail Prices of 
Heroin in Western and Central Europe, 1998–2011 (From UNODC 2012) 
5.  Consumption 
Consumption is the last step in the illegal drug trafficking process and is also 
necessary for completing the supply and demand chain. The main Afghan opium 
consumption countries are Iran, Pakistan, Central Asian countries and India which has 





Europe (about 1.4 million) than Asian countries, but they are financially more profitable. 
                                                 




Therefore, opiates are trafficked towards Western Europe along the Balkan route via 
Pakistan and Iran.38  
A United Nations’ estimate of annual opiate consumption from 1998 to 2008 
reveals an increase of 34.5% from 12.9 million in 1998 to 17.35 million in 2008.39  
According to the UNODC 2012 report, there are approximately 21 million opiates users 
worldwide suggesting an increase of 21% in consumers from 2008 to 2012.40 The main 
reason for such an increase in consumption is the lower price level of illicit drugs.41 
B. THE NEXUS BETWEEN OPIUM AND TALIBAN/PKK FINANCING  
Terrorist organizations use different methods of financing to run their operations. 
The sources of the Taliban and the PKK financing have been through state sponsorship, 
popular support, legal and illegal activities; however, both organizations draw their 
highest revenue from illegal drug trafficking.42 
1. The Nexus between Opium and Taliban Financing 
In a July 2010 U.S. Senate Afghan Counter-narcotics Strategy session, the 
committee found that “The Taliban is linked to the drug trade at every level from the 
poppy fields, to the heroin processing laboratories, to the transportation and distribution 
of the illicit product. The Taliban has become both a terrorist organization and a drug 
cartel, ideology and greed being their principle motivators.”43  
 
                                                 
38 World Drug Report 2009, 44. 
39 War on Drugs Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, 4. 
40 UNODC World Drug Report 2012, 26. 
41 Ibid. 96. 
42 Peters, Seeds of Terror : How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 13, Abdulkadir 
Onay, "PKK Criminal Networks and Fronts in Europe," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, no. 
Policywatch 1344 (February 21, 2008). 




The Taliban over time have tied stronger links with illegal drug trade. In an 
interview with Peters, Seth Jones, a RAND Corporation Analyst, analyzed that “As the 
Afghanistan poppy crop explodes past 4 billion a year there is no question, no question at 
all, that the Taliban has been increasingly involved both directly and indirectly in 
narcotics.”44 According to Moore, the Taliban no longer are fighting for Kabul, their 
tactics have shifted to protecting poppy fields and drug convoys.45 This is further 
evidenced by the captured Taliban members’ confessions that the main source of their 
operational funding’s comes from drug money.46  
Determining how much the Taliban benefit from the drug trade each year is a 
matter of great debate and the estimates range from 30 to 200 million dollars annually.47 
Since the Taliban do not have any concrete records available in either handwritten or 
digital form, it is unlikely that the real figure of drug earning can be calculated with 
complete accuracy.48  Nevertheless, in rough numbers the UNODC Addiction, Crime and 
Insurgency document displays that a decade ago the Taliban earned $75–100 million per 
year by taxing opium poppy cultivation; however, since 2005, the Taliban have earned 
$90–160 million per year just from taxing opium production and trade.49 According to 
our calculation, the Taliban earn approximately $530–570 million annually from the 
illegal opium cultivation, manufacturing, and shipment. The breakdown of this money is 
elaborated in the subsequent paragraphs. 
                                                 
44 Peters, Seeds of Terror : How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 11. 
45 Molly Moore, "NATO Confronts Surprisingly Fierce Taliban," Washington Post February 26, 2008. 
46  Peters, Seeds of Terror : How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 13. 
47 Ibid., 83. 
48 Ibid., 83. 
49 http://www.unodc.org, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/October/unodc-reveals-devastating-impact-of-afghan-




Figure 6.   The Taliban’s Annual Opium Revenue Breakdown 
a.  Cultivation 
The Taliban provide protection and support to Afghan farmers to cultivate 
poppy crops. Although the Taliban profit by taxing farmers, they have also started their 
own cultivation of the poppy. The UNODC statistics claim that over time the opium 
cultivation has increased in the Taliban control regions.  
In an analysis of Afghan opium cultivation, Peters described that in 2006 
two- thirds of Afghan opium was cultivated in Taliban held areas. In 2007 poppy 
cultivation in Taliban controlled areas was 70%. However, in 2008 more than 98% of 
opium cultivation was directly under Taliban control.50 The UNODC Afghanistan opium 
survey of 2012 depicts 6 out of 34 provinces cultivate approximately 80% of all Afghan 
opium.51 These areas include the Taliban controlled Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Uruzgen, 
Nangahar and Nimroz provinces.52  
Peters states that the Taliban collect a 10% tax (ushr) from poppy farmers, 
and this percentage of taxation is applicable at the farm level only.53 The UNODC 
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estimates the Afghan opium yield in 2011was 5800 metric tons, of which 98% came from 
the Taliban control regions. The 2011 average farm gate price of opium was 250$ per kg 
in Afghanistan.54  This data reveals that the Taliban have netted approximately $142 
million annually from the opium cultivation process in 2011. The equation for calculating 
the Taliban’s revenue in opium cultivation is depicted below.  
     10% of opium production in kg.                                                                           580,000 
x   % of opium cultivated land under the Taliban control                                  x          0.98 
x   Farm gate price of opium in $/Kg                                                                  x          250                                
=  Cultivation Revenue                                                                                 $ 142,100,000 
b.  Manufacturing 
The Taliban also tax drug manufactures according to the refined end 
product of the opium crop. In this link of the drug trafficking chain, there is evidence of 
the Taliban’s direct involvement as well. Peters claims that the Taliban mainly receive 
money by taxing farmers and protecting labs and shipments; however, there are some 
Taliban commanders who even run their own heroin labs.55  
Peters observes that the conversion of opium into morphine base is an easy 
two stages process which requires minimum resources and expertise. However, in the 
next step of converting morphine into heroin, there are greater difficulties, requirements, 
resources, and expertise required.56  
In 2011, the total heroin produced in Afghanistan was estimated around 
467 tons.57 According to Peters, the Taliban control more than 50 laboratories, and tax 
250$ for every kg refined.58 Therefore, in 2011 the Taliban generated approximately $ 
116 million annually from the manufacturing process. The equation for calculating the 
Taliban’s revenue in opium manufacturing is depicted below.  
                                                 
54 UNODC World Drug Report 2012, 26, 30. 
55 Peters, Seeds of Terror : How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 12. 
56 Gretchen Peters, Interview, 10 September 2012, 18:00. 
57 UNODC World Drug Report 2012, 28. 
58 Gretchen Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace, August 2009. 
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     Heroin Manufactured in kg                                                                                  467,000 
x   % of Heroin labs under the Taliban control                                                  x          1.00 
x   revenue charged by the Taliban $/kg                                                             x           250                               
=  Manufacturing Revenue                                                                           $ 116,750,000 
 
c.  Shipment 
There are three main routes for shipping opium out of Afghanistan. The 
Taliban either control these routes or provide protection and diversion tactics to ensure 
safe shipment of the opium. According to the survey conducted by Peters, 65% of the 
Afghan people believe that the Taliban’s main drug activities are focused on providing 
security to the opium crop and protecting the drug shipments leaving the area.59  
While discussing the Taliban tactics in the drug shipment process, Peters 
says that the Taliban attack security checkpoints to ensure the safety of drug trafficking. 
They even launch diversionary strikes to shift the security forces focus away from a 
major consignment route. The Taliban escort illegal opium consignments to earn millions 
of dollars in protection fees, which can be as much as 20% of the complete 
consignment.60 
In our assessment, the shipment stage is the node within the drug 
trafficking process whereby the Taliban generate the highest revenue. According to 
Peters, “Extrapolating the charges per truck leaving farm areas and protection fees 
reported to researchers for this study, the Taliban rake in as much as $250 million more 
every year providing armed protection for drug shipments moving through their control 
zones. They also receive tens of millions of dollars’ worth of material supplies, including 
vehicles, food, and satellite phones.”61 According to our calculations, the Taliban 
generate approximately $300 million annually from the shipment stage.       
      Heroin shipped from the Taliban controlled regions in kg                                 360,000 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 23. 
60 Peters, Seeds of Terror, How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 116. 
61 Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban, 23. 
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x    rate of transport protection fees $/kg                                                           x           850                                
=   Shipment Revenue                                                                                   $ 306,000,000 
d.  Sale 
The Taliban actively involved themselves by either taxing drug traders or 
directly conducting their own business; however, they always tend to separate themselves 
from selling these illicit drugs. According to Peters’ survey, local people acknowledge 
the Taliban’s role in the drug trade; however, they categorically reject the Taliban’s direct 
involvement in the sale of opium.62 Therefore, this research does not find that the Taliban 
gained any revenue from the sale of opium. 
e.  Consumption 
If the Taliban members consumed heroin, it could be a financial drain on 
their organization. However, according to the Taliban ideology and their version of 
Islam, the consumption of an opiate is prohibited. Griffin discussed the Taliban’s version 
of Sharia Law in which the consumption of opiates is forbidden; however, the production 
and trade of opium are allowed.63 Abdul Rashid the Anti-Drug Force Commander of 
Kandahar, states that the Taliban support the opium trade because it is consumed by 
infidels in the West, and not by Afghan Muslims.64 However, it is important to note that 
heroin consumption has significantly increased in Afghanistan and other Muslim 
neighboring countries.65 Regardless, this is not a significant cost to the Taliban. 
2.  The Nexus between Opium and PKK Financing 
After leaving Afghanistan, opium travels to different parts of the world. Although 
the highest demand is in Asia, the greatest profit is generated in the European market. 
The main route from Afghanistan to Europe is via Iran, through Turkey, to the Balkan 
                                                 
62 Peters, Seeds of Terror, How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 117. 
63 Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind : The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London; Sterling, 
Va: Pluto Press, 2001), 153. 
64 Peters, Seeds of Terror : How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 68. 
65 UNODC World Drug Report 2012, 77. 
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regions. It is along this route that the PKK is the most active organization and gains the 
highest benefit. There is also a direct link between the Taliban and the PKK. Haji Bashir 
confessed in front of the DEA officials that the Afghan smuggler would pass the opium 
to PKK agents who would move these drugs to the European countries.66  
There are numbers of investigations, reports, analyses, and confessions which 
have identified PKK involvement in the illegal drug trade. According to the U.S. State 
Department reports, the PKK use heroin production and trafficking to support its terrorist 
activities. These reports not only indicate the PKK’s direct involvement in transporting 
and marketing narcotics in Europe, but also reveal indirect taxations on drug traders to 
finance terrorist actions.67 After the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK increased their 
involvement in the drug trade, which is evident by the large number of drug seizures in 
Europe between 2004 and 2005. The BBC claimed 80 % of the European drug market 
was controlled by the PKK. 68   
There are numerous claims of the PKK’s revenue being derived from the illegal 
drug trade, which vary from $50 million69 to $2.5 billion70. According to our calculation 
made from the 2010 report, the PKK generates approximately $600 - 700 million 
annually from illegal heroin trade.  
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Figure 7.   The PKK’s Annual Opium Revenue Breakdown 
a.  Cultivation 
Laciner claims that the PKK started to produce opium poppies under 
Syrian control beginning in 1982.71 Similarly Sehirli states that the PKK produced 60 
tons of heroin and hashish annually in the Bakaa Valley in Lebanon during the 1980s and 
early 1990s.72 According to Soylemez, the PKK is also involved in opium plantations 
within the rural areas of Turkey. He claims that due to financial troubles, the PKK have 
become actively involved in the cultivation of opium since 2004.73 However, these claims 
about the PKK’s involvement in opium cultivation could not be further substantiated. 
b.  Manufacturing 
The PKK directly or indirectly involve themselves in the opium 
manufacturing process. They either own or tax the drug laboratories situated in different 
regions under their control. According to Laciner, the PKK constructed heroin processing 
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laboratories in the late 1980s to draw the greatest benefit from the opium drug trade.74 
The U.S. Treasury Department highlights that the PKK processes the morphine base 
received from Afghanistan into heroin at the laboratories situated in Turkey, and they sell 
it throughout Europe.75   
According to Mandalawi, the PKK possesses heroin labs in the mountains 
of Turkey.76 However, Laciner claims that the PKK not only possesses labs in Turkey, 
but also has constructed drug laboratories in some East European countries.77 Similarly, 
Aktan and Koknar claim that in addition to laboratories in Turkey, the PKK also 
possesses heroin labs in Northern Iraq.78  
According to Observatoire Geopolitique Des Drugs (OGD), the PKK has 
set up opium laboratories in areas under its control, and an official Turkish report reveals 
that 18 people, among others, arrested in 15 different lab cases were found to be members 
of the PKK.79 Apart from owning laboratories, Solomon claims that the PKK receives 
protection tax money from drug labs in the eastern part of Turkey.80 A convicted drug 
criminal confessed that the PKK imposed 1000 DM (approximately $500) per kg 
commission on heroin producers.81 According to our calculation, the PKK generates 
approximately $25 million annually from the heroin manufacturing process. The equation 
for calculating the PKK’s revenue in opium manufacturing is depicted below.  
 
      
                                                 
74 Laciner, Drug Smuggling as a Means of PKK Terrorism, August 17,.2012. 
75 Benjamin Freedman and Matthew Levitt, "Contending with the PKK's Narco-Terrorism " The 
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Drugs and Narcoterrorism the University of Nottingham (Autumn 2011), 3, 4. 
77 Laciner, Drug Smuggling as a Means of PKK Terrorism, August.17,.2012. 
78 Yonah Alexander, ed., Combatting Terrorism Strategies of Ten Countries University of Michigan 
Press, 2002), 291. 
79 Fuat Salih Sahin, "Case Studies in Terrorism-Drug Connection: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and the Shining Path " The University of North Texas), 45. 
80 Ibid.50. 
81 Behsat Ekici, Phil Williams and Ayhan Akbulut, "The PKK and the KDSs: Cooperation, 
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Heroin Manufactured in kg                                                                                    50,000  
x   % of Heroin labs under the PKK control                                                     x            1.00 
x   revenue charged by the Taliban $/kg                                                           x             500                               
=  Manufacturing Revenue                                                                             $ 25,000,000 
 
c. Shipment 
According to Laciner, the PKK found themselves to be luckily located on 
the route of the “Golden Crescent” for drug smuggling between the opium producing 
East and the heroin consuming West. He argues that in the beginning of the 1980s, the 
PKK started to gain huge wealth from drug taxation in their controlled regions. However, 
when the PKK diaspora increased in the Western European countries, the drug shipment 
process became easier for them.82 
According to Laciner, Turkey is not a significant drug consuming country, 
but it does contribute to drug transportation.83 Freedman and Levitt argue that the PKK 
gets its highest profit by taxing the drug smugglers in their controlled regions, and this 
taxation serves as a crucial income source for the group.84 The convicted drug criminal 
noted earlier confessed that the PKK imposed a 10% tax on heroin traffickers.85 
According to our calculation, the PKK generates approximately $325 million annually 
from the shipping of heroin, in addition to wholesale revenue.86 The displayed figures in 
the calculation of shipment revenue equation is for Norway only. However, a similar 
procedure is adapted for calculating the PKK’s revenue generated from the rest of the 
European countries. In our calculation, the wholesale revenue is added into shipment 
revenue because the heroin has not yet reached the consumers.  
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   Total Heroin Trafficked on the Balkan Route                                                          80,000 
x Est. PKK’s Control at the Turkish Border                                                            x       0.8 
x Taxation Rate                                                                                                        x       0.1 
x Percentage Value of the Smuggled Heroin by the PKK                                       x       0.2 
x Price of 1 kg of Heroin in the Afghan Wholesale Market                                    x    2400 




   Amount of Heroin reaches to European Country(eg Norway)                                   1000 
x Prevalence Ratios of each European Country                                                     x  0.0003                    
x 15–64 Population of each European Country                                                 x  
2,195,734 
x (Total Population of each Country/ Kurdish Diaspora)                   x  (3,182,224/12447)                               
x Est. Market Control of the PKK                                                                            x 0.0073 
x (If Diaspora Ratio < 0.005, Est. Wholesale Share of the PKK, (1-Retail Share of the 
PKK)                                                                                                                      x  0 .0025 
x Wholesale Price of the Heroin for each Country                                              x     22120 
= Wholesale Revenue                                                                                           6,798,566 
d. Sale 
The PKK is actively involved in heroin sales across Europe, utilizing their 
diaspora. They also tax other drug sellers, and generally control nearly all of the 
European heroin market. According to Soylemez, one of the PKK militants has confessed 
to the organization’s dominance in the European drug trade. He reveals that all the drug 
dealers have to pay a 10 percent share of every sale to the organization, and the entire 
drug trafficking process is controlled solely by the PKK.   
The PKK utilizes its diaspora for controlling the street level sales of illegal 
drugs in the European market.87 Even Kurdish children from 10–15 years old are 
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involved in selling drug in many European cities.88 Similarly, the heavy PKK 
involvement in the drug trade is evidenced by the number of PKK members being 
captured in various European cities and Turkey.89 According to our calculations, the PKK 
earns approximately $300 million annually from heroin street sales revenue.90  The 
displayed figure in the calculation of the sale revenue equation is for Norway only. 
However, the similar procedure is adapted for calculating the PKK’s revenue generated 
from the rest of the European countries. 
   The Amount of Heroin reaches to Europe(eg Norway)                                             1000 
x  Prevalence Ratios of each European Country                                                   x  0.0003                    
x  15–64 Population of each European Country                                               x  2,195,734 
x (Total Population of each Country/ Kurdish Diaspora)                   x  (3,182,224/12447) 
x  Est. Market Control of the PKK                                                                          x 0.0073 
x  If Diaspora Ratio >=0.005, then PKK Est. Retail Share, otherwise,”0”         x  0 .0021                               
x  Retail Price of the Heroin for each country x  1000 (tons into Kgs)            x  45 x 1000 
= Street Level Sales Revenue                                                                            11,617, 802 
 
e. Consumption 
The PKK motivates people to consume illicit drugs because of the 
maximum money generated by utilizing drug addicts to fulfill the organization’s political 
objectives. According to Soylemez, two drug dealers confessed that the PKK gives drugs 
to young people in the East and Southeast part of the Turkey as a reward for participating 
in pro-PKK demonstrations. Another PKK militant also confessed that some members of 
the PKK are addicted to drugs, and the organization can convince them to conduct any 
criminal activity in return for drugs. He also confessed that the PKK is not only selling 
drugs in Western European cities, but also poisoning Kurdish children as well. In the 
Hakkari district, the average age of drug consumers is 14 years old and an estimated 45 
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89 Ibid. 




percent of the people in this age group are addicted to illegal substances.91  Over the long 
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III. NARCOTERRORISM ANALYSIS 
In the previous chapter, the extent of the Taliban’s and the PKK’s involvement in 
the drug trafficking process (cultivation, manufacturing, shipment, sale, consumption) 
was explored. In this chapter, the Taliban and the PKK’s involvement in the 
narcoterrorism process will be analyzed and suitable recommendations for reducing these 
terrorist organizations’ funds raised through the drug trafficking process will be 
suggested. This chapter also introduces a viable counter narcotics model which provides 
a reasonable solution for cutting the links between drugs and terrorists.  
 
Figure 8.   The Heroin Balkan Route and Price from Farm Gate to the Street Level  
The map (Figure 8) displays the price of one kg of heroin at different places. The 
price of heroin is exponentially increased from its origin (Afghanistan) to the street sale 
in Europe. The map also depicts the amount of money the Taliban and the PKK generate 
from this illegal trade. Therefore, it is important to critically analyze each stage of the 
heroin trade in order to deduce effective countermeasures against it. 
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A.  THE TALIBAN ANALYSIS 
After the Taliban’s fall from power in 2001, the U.S. and its allies announced that 
confronting the Afghan opium trade would be a top priority during the Afghan re-
establishment and reconstitution phase. During the Bush Administration, counter 
narcotics policy was basically focused on poppy eradication and drug interdiction. 
However, the Obama Administration changed the policy to crop substitution and 
alternative livelihood programs. This policy change was made to provide benefits to poor 
Afghan farmers who had started to support anti-government groups due to the poppy 
eradication campaign.92  
The climate conditions of Afghanistan are ideally suited for growing poppy crops. 
This crop is drought resistant, has a high weight-to-profit ratio, has a high market 
demand, and does not require safe handling during transportation. Targeting the 
cultivation stage is difficult due to the vastness of the area where the poppy crops are 
grown in the ungoverned zones. The country’s poor economy, weak governmental 
control, scarcity of alternative crops, and the incomparable profits of the opium trade 
motivate millions of farmers to harvest the poppy crop. The eradication of the opium crop 
would mostly affect the poor Afghan farmers, and negligibly affect the drug traders as 
they would increase the price of opium to minimize their losses and would also utilize the 
opium stockpile (as witnessed in 2001). Since an eradication campaign lowers the poppy 
yield, the Taliban generate less revenue on their fixed 10 percent taxation on the opium 
crop. Nevertheless, the eradication campaign can motivate poor farmers to support the 
Taliban, which is the biggest challenge for the counter terrorist strategy. 
The Taliban gain approximately 21% of their opium drug money from the 
manufacturing stage. Heroin manufacturing labs are mostly located in Taliban-controlled 
regions; however, these labs are few, countable and targetable. The process of 
establishing and relocating these labs is very difficult. Moreover, the heroin 
manufacturing is also a difficult process which requires professional expertise and rare 
                                                 
92 Christopher M. Blanchard , “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy” Congressional Research 
Service, April 21, 2009. 
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chemicals. The 2011 UNODC report reveals that half of the opium production was 
processed into heroin, and the other half was not, which implies that the opium not 
processed is kept in storage for manufacturing into heroin for future security or wealth. 
As compared to the cultivation stage, there are fewer ordinary people involved in this 
stage. Therefore, targeting this stage will cause less resentment, and it will also not result 
in the loss of popular support for the government. From the vast poppy fields, the opium 
yield is directed to a few heroin labs, which makes this stage vulnerable for targeting. 
The Taliban earn approximately 54% of the opium drug money from the shipment 
process, which makes that stage the most lucrative. However, the shipment stage is 
difficult to target due to the harsh geographical conditions involved along the shipment 
routes, the ungoverned zones, and the numerous alternative routes available. For the 
Afghan opium trade, shipment is the most dangerous stage for the professional drug 
traffickers who are vulnerable to capture by law enforcement agencies. The Taliban 
mostly involve themselves indirectly by providing protection for these drug convoys. The 
element of trust and secrecy amongst various participants is essential for the safe 
shipment of drugs. The drug traffickers prefer to smuggle heroin as compared to 
morphine or raw opium, due to the relatively small size, better odor, higher profit, and 
lower probability of being caught. This particular aspect also benefits the Taliban as they 
generate more taxation money from heroin shipments as compared to morphine or opium. 
In contrast to the cultivation stage, but similar to the manufacturing stage, there are only 
criminals and terrorists involved in this stage. Therefore, targeting this stage likely will 
not cause resentment or loss of the government’s popular support. 
The Taliban consider the selling and consumption of opium products to be against 
the Islamic ideology; therefore, they tend to separate themselves from selling or 
consuming these illicit drugs. We did not find any concrete evidence of the Taliban’s 
direct or indirect involvement in the process of opium sale and consumption. The Taliban 
considered this trade as legitimate because they think the “western infidels” will be 
harmed by opium consumption. However, the consumption of opium by both Muslims in 
Afghanistan and its neighboring countries has significantly increased. Therefore, there is 
a need for a strong media campaign projecting the Taliban’s contributions to increased 
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opium consumption by Muslims. This campaign will expose the Taliban’s false 
ideological Islamic concept and will help turn popular support against them. Counter 
narcotics and law enforcement agencies have attacked the opium supply without causing 
any drop in the demand for heroin. The opium eradication campaign has led to the 
increased farm-gate price of the poppy, thus further increasing the incentive for Afghan 
farmers to plant. Wide-scale spraying has also resulted in increased profit to the Taliban, 
and increased sufferings for the Afghan farmers. The net outcome of falling supply and 
constant demand (as displayed Figure 3–2) has been a rise in the price of heroin. This has 
led to increased production to meet future demand.  
 
Figure 9.   Heroin Supply and Demand Chain. 
Figure 9 describes the heroin supply and demand curves. The horizontal axis 
represents the quantity and the vertical axis represents the price of heroin. The demand 
curve denotes the quantity of heroin desired by buyers, and the desired quantity is the 
amount of heroin people are ready to buy at a certain price. The supply curve denotes the 
quantity of heroin being offered by the producers, and this offered quantity is the amount 
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of heroin products that producers are ready to supply while receiving a certain price. As a 
result of this relationship, the price is a reflection of both supply and demand.93  
Suppose that 1 kg of heroin is consumed by 100 individuals, and the price 
established by the supply and demand curve is $70 per gram. By only reducing the supply 
(say 500 gram) and not reducing the demand (the same 100 individuals), the price will 
increase two times as compared to previous values ($140 gram). It is evident that even if 
we reduce the supply (producers’) side without reducing the demand (consumers), the 
terrorist groups and the drug dealers will still be able to accrue their revenue from the 
heroin trade. 
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Stages Involvement Percentage Members Strength Weakness 
Cultivation Indirect Quarter Tax Collectors 
and Protectors 
Controlled land, ideal climate 
condition, poor farmers’ needs, 
eradication increased the 










few lab owners 
Labs in ungoverned zones, 
ample opium availability 
Only a few labs, difficult 
to establish and relocate, 
chemical availability, 
targeting labs does not 








Adverse geographical condition, 
Alternative routes, ineffective 
LAEs 
Increased risk involved in 
protection, targeting 
shipment does not affect 
the Taliban’s popular 
support   
Sale No Nil No - - 
Consumption No Nil No  Increased Western consumers 
increase the Taliban’s popular 
support 
Increased Muslim 
consumers decrease the 
Taliban’s popular support 
Table 1.    Summary Analysis of the Taliban  
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B. THE PKK ANALYSIS 
The PKK’s initial involvement in the drug trade was mainly indirect. However, with the 
passage of time they have started to actively participate in the lucrative drug trade. This has led 
to the PKK being a financially strong and politically weak terrorist organization. The rough 
geography of the PKK dominated regions provides natural safe havens for conducting the illegal 
drug trade. Moreover, the PKK effectively utilizes the destitute Kurdish diaspora in European 
countries to run the drug business. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the PKK was directly involved in opium cultivation; 
however, they are no longer able to cultivate opium due to the Turkish government’s effective 
policies and lack of state sponsorship. As compared to Afghanistan, the climatic conditions in the 
PKK dominated area are not considered suitable for poppy growth. We were unable to find any 
conclusive evidence of funds being generated by the PKK through opium cultivation.  
The PKK generates only 4% of its opium drug money from the manufacturing stage. The 
PKK’s lack of ability to cultivate opium and its dependence on Afghan opium causes only 
marginal revenue to be generated from this stage. Although, the transportation of acetic 
anhydride from European countries to Turkey is relatively easier compared to Afghanistan, most 
of the opium is already in the form of heroin when it gets to Turkey. As compared to the Taliban, 
the PKK’s involvement in the manufacturing stage is significantly lower; however, it is possible 
that the PKK will enhance its direct involvement due to the lucrative incentives in this stage. 
According to UNODC 2010 report, the PKK generates approximately 50% of its opium 
drug money from the shipment process, which makes it the most lucrative stage for the PKK. 
The PKK has the inherit advantages of a central location in between the highest production and 
the maximum revenue collection zones. Initially, the PKK preferred to tax heroin smugglers, 
since shipment is the riskiest stage and they are vulnerable to capture by law enforcement 
agencies. Recently, however, the PKK has begun actively involving themselves in heroin 
shipments due to the lucrative nature of this stage. The PKK has an advantage given the 
shipment routes in the Northern Iraq, the presence of ungoverned zones, which provide safe 
havens, and the availability of numerous alternative routes. The PKK’s active involvement in the 
heroin shipment stage is supported by their well-established members and their diaspora 
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presence in both the Middle East and Europe. The PKK faces a disadvantage, though, in that 
capable Turkish Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) have seized almost twice as much heroin as 
all the entire European LEAs.94 The risk of direct involvement in drug trafficking is higher than 
the risk of indirect involvement by terrorist organizations. Therefore, as a counter narcoterrorism 
approach, this study recommends influencing the PKK to shift from indirect to direct 
involvement in the drug trade. This can be achieved by sowing distrust within the PKK and the 
drug dealers. Both groups have a natural alliance, but lack trust. This weak and vulnerable link 
can be targeted by running a strong information campaign which can lead to decoupling the link 
between the two groups. This action will lead the PKK to a more active involvement in the 
shipment stage and will make them turn away from their ideology.   
According to UNODC 2010 report, the PKK earn approximately 46% of their opium 
drug money from the sale of heroin products in Europe. Recently, the PKK have increased their 
direct involvement, due to the huge amount of money involved in this stage. The PKK not only 
utilize their well trained personnel, but also force Kurdish immigrants living in Europe to 
become involved in heroin sales. The PKK can easily find street sellers, due to plenty of 
unemployed and poor Kurdish immigrants in Europe. Moreover, these immigrants do not 
hesitate to utilize their children in drug sales since their age protects them from being criminally 
responsible for such acts. In addition, the PKK can easily recruit new street dealers from the 
refugee camps and cultural clubs. As a result, the PKK are less vulnerable in the street sale stage 
due to the abundance of personnel available to replace the captured sellers. On the other hand, 
the PKK has lost the political support of European and the U.S. governments due to their 
conversion into a criminal organization. 
 






 Involvement Percentage Members Strength Weakness 
Cultivation No - No No Land availability, Adverse 
climate condition 
Manufacturing Less Very Less A few tax 
collectors 
Easy access to 
chemicals 
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C. COUNTER NARCO-TERRORISM SOLUTION MODEL 
 
Figure 10.   Counter Narcoterrorism Solution Model 
The process of narcoterrorism diverges or converges at each stage. Figure 10 
displays the counter-narcoterrorism model from opium cultivation to street level sale. The 
opium from the wide-spread poppy field converges at a few, countable, and targetable 
heroin manufacturing labs. The heroin products follow an ongoing diverging path from 
manufacturing to selling stage. This path also splits into smaller sub nodes which make 
the act of interdiction very difficult. It is important to note that the heroin manufacturing 
stage is the only stage in the process where the path converges. Therefore, it is suggested 
that targeting the manufacturing stage would result into an effective way of reducing the 
terrorist funding raised through opium money. 
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The solution model proposes that the cultivation stage should not be targeted, as it 
is not cost effective due to the huge amount of time and resource requirements. Instead of 
aggressive eradication campaigns in Afghanistan, the policy of crop substitution and 
alternative livelihood programs will make the Taliban vulnerable due to the loss of the 
much needed popular support from the millions of Afghan farmers. In contrast, the PKK 
are not vulnerable in the cultivation stage of the drug trafficking process since they are 
not involved in it.  
This model proposes that the manufacturing stage should be targeted as it is the 
only stage where the products are converged into a few targetable facilities. Although the 
manufacturing stage only accounts for approximately one fifth of the total opium revenue 
generated by the Taliban, it can cut the Taliban’s finances raised through the rest of the 
drug trafficking chain. With less heroin produced in Afghanistan, the PKK funding would 
be substantially reduced as well. However, the PKK is comparatively less vulnerable in 
the manufacturing stage of the drug trafficking process since they tax or run only a few 
heroin processing labs. Nevertheless, this model suggests that an increase in the PKK’s 
involvement in the heroin manufacturing stage will make them more vulnerable to 
counter terrorism efforts. 
This model proposes that the shipment and the sale stage should not be targeted, 
as it diverges into many smaller nodes which are difficult to target and also are not 
considered cost effective due to the huge amount of time and resource requirements 
needed. The Taliban and the PKK are less vulnerable in the shipment stage due to the 
availability of alternative routes and dispensable personnel. The Taliban do not involve 
themselves in the heroin sale stage; however, the PKK actively participate in the street 
level sale of heroin. The shipment and sales stage interdiction efforts have not been 
effective since even the large number of seizures of heroin products and the capture of 




The countermeasures which effect the terrorist organizations the most involve 
reducing their drug money. This thesis establishes that both the Taliban and the PKK gain 
huge amounts of money from the heroin trade. Therefore, there is a strong need to 
combat the illegal opium trade, and it requires a long term commitment, policy 
amendments, effective law enforcement agencies, and international cooperation. 
1. Targeting the Manufacturing Stage 
According to this thesis finding, targeting the manufacturing stage is not only cost 
effective, but also a viable option. As compared to other drug trade stages, this stage is 
the only one where the products are converged into countable and targetable laboratories. 
Targeting cultivation, shipment, and sale stages would require comparatively more 
resources when compared to targeting the manufacturing stage. Attacking this stage also 
substantially reduces both the Taliban and the PKK’s drug money since it directly affects 
the rest of the drug trafficking chain. 
Through intelligence, the exact locations of the heroin laboratories can be traced. 
The laboratories located in the governed zones should be targeted with the combined help 
of local and international law enforcement agencies. The main aim of this ground raid is 
to physically destroy the labs and make them permanently unusable. The labs located in 
the ungoverned zones should be targeted by international coalition air strikes. 
Heroin manufacturing requires specific precursors which mostly originate from 
Europe. Therefore, there is a strong need for a policy describing these precursors as 
illegal substances. By stopping the precursors from reaching the heroin laboratories, the 
manufacturing stage will become very difficult. These precursors should be treated in a 
similar manner to illegal drugs. This banning of precursors will create an obstacle for 
terrorist organizations in heroin manufacturing. In order to develop a strategy for 
precursors’ seizures, it will be necessary to identify the agents, possible routes and 
methods of transportation of these chemicals, and subsequently launch a comprehensive 
attack against all nodes of a precursor shipment.  
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2. Strong Information Campaign 
A strong information campaigns against the terrorist organizations can not only 
portray a negative image, but also result in an effective counterterrorism policy. This 
information campaign should include propaganda programs against the terrorist 
organizations through several media tools. These tools should include televisions, radio 
broadcasts, videos, blogs, pamphlets, and social media.  
The supply and demand chain can also be targeted by a strong information 
campaign. By collecting undeniable evidence that proves the terrorist organization’s 
involvement in the illegal drug trade, such a campaign can result in the loss of the 
terrorist organization’s ideology and credibility. Their drug trade involvement being 
projected in media resulted in the loss of support among their sympathizers and 
supportive governments. This campaign resulted in the loss of the PKK’s members and 
supporters due to a realization of the shift in their ideology.  
The information campaign must include attempts at reducing the demand for 
heroin. Focusing on the youth of the society is very critical and can yield positive results 
against the drug trade. This reduction of demand not only helps in building a healthy 
society, but also reduces the terrorist organization’s drug money. 
3. Policy Measures 
Despite the concentrated efforts of international agencies and governments, there 
is no evidence of success against narcoterrorism. A long-term policy of alternative 
livelihood program is effective and needs to continue. Eradication of drugs can be a part 
of the policy if it is only implemented in areas that are free of terrorist activities and 
where sufficient alternatives are available to the farmers. The present alternative 
livelihood policy in Afghanistan should continue as an effective and long-term 
narcoterrorism countermeasure. This long term policy decreases the amount of opium 
yield, which reduces the funds of terrorist organizations. The other strategic effect this 
policy gains is a loss of much needed popular support for a terrorist organization. 
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4. Increasing National and International Efforts 
Enhanced international focus and concentrated efforts are required to effectively 
fight against narcoterrorism. These efforts should also be centralized under one principal 
agency chartered to lead the effort, and they will require effective monitoring, 
coordination, intelligence, and additional funding and personnel. These increased efforts 
would hurt the terrorist organization’s finances and should include illegal money 
laundering, reduction of ungoverned zones, and efforts to disrupt the focus of terrorist 
organizations. 
Although this thesis does not address the money transferring method of terrorist 
organizations, all viable measures against money laundering should be actively 
incorporated against terrorist organizations’ funding. Terrorist organizations need to 
regularly transfer huge amounts of drug money from one place to another. This 
laundering of suspicious transactions requires monitoring from financial institutions and 
other regulatory authorities. Therefore, there still exists a need for enhanced transparency 
and integrity of financial institutions for effectively countering this threat. 
International effort is also required in decreasing the ungoverned zones where this 
illegal drug is cultivated, manufactured, and trafficked. The ungoverned zones for opium 
trade include Afghanistan and Iraq, which are beneficial to drug dealers as well as 
terrorist organizations. These measures can shrink the terrorist organizations’ capacity 
and reduce their illegal finances. 
The international effort should also try to disrupt the focus of terrorist 
organizations. The risk of direct involvement in drug trafficking is higher than the risk of 
indirect involvement by terrorist organizations. Therefore, as a counter narcoterrorism 
approach, states should influence terrorist organizations to shift from indirect to direct 
involvement in the drug trade. This can be achieved by sowing distrust within the PKK 
and the drug dealers. This action will make them more vulnerable and effectively reduce 
their drug money. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
After the Cold War, states generally stopped financing terrorist organizations, and 
that change led these organizations to finance their activities on their own. Terrorist 
organizations utilize a number of illegal sources to generate funds; however, they become 
even more devastating when combined with illicit drug trafficking. Due to the huge 
financial benefit of the illegal drug trade, terrorist organizations are able to acquire 
sophisticated weapons and continue their illegal activities. The link between terrorist 
organizations and illegal drugs must be cut to effectively fight against terrorism. While 
there exists no doubt for the need to eliminate both threats, it is not an easy task and 
requires a significant amount of resources and effort. The best way to hurt both threats is 
to target their finances because they simply cannot function efficiently without money. 
This thesis focuses on the Taliban and the PKK’s involvement in the opium trade. 
This thesis fills a gap by illustrating the extent to which terrorist organizations use drugs 
to raise funds in five stages of the heroin trade, which include cultivation, manufacturing, 
shipment, sale, and consumption. The Taliban and the PKK generate huge amounts of 
money from the opium trade. The Taliban makes most of its money from the cultivation, 
manufacturing, and shipment stages; however, the PKK earns its funds from the shipment 
and sale of heroin. These two terrorist organizations have their peculiar strengths and 
weaknesses which are identified in this thesis. The identification of weak and vulnerable 
links between terrorist organizations and drug trafficking can help law enforcement, drug 
control and monetary agencies combat this menace effectively. 
The counter narcoterrorism solution model displays both the convergent and 
divergent stages of the opium trade. The manufacturing stage is the only stage where the 
products converge into countable and targetable laboratories. This model identifies that 
targeting the opium manufacturing process is not only cost effective, but also reduces 
both the Taliban’s and PKK’s illegal funds. This model can be applied to other terrorist 
organizations and other drugs of the world for the purposes of identification and 
reduction of funds generated through the drug trafficking process.  
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Lastly, this thesis does not try to solve drug abuse problems, but attempts to 
reduce the funds received by terrorist organizations through illegal drug trafficking. This 
thesis provides a direction and a particular stage to effectively target the narcoterrorism 
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